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Tase Me One More Time: An Analysis of the Ninth
Circuit’s Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
Qualified Immunity, and Tasers in Brooks v. City of
Seattle
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brooks v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
officers were entitled to qualified immunity when they tased a
pregnant woman who refused to exit her car after declining to sign a
traffic ticket.1 Following primarily the multi-factor test from Graham
v. Connor,2 the court found that “the Officers [were] entitled to
qualified immunity” because their “use of force [was] reasonable and
not excessive under the Fourth Amendment.”3
This Note contends that the Ninth Circuit was incorrect in
finding that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for two
reasons: (1) the court should not have raised probable cause issues
sua sponte after the officers waived those arguments, and (2) the
officers used excessive force when they tased a pregnant woman
three times. This Note will begin with an overview of the Brooks
decision in Part II followed by an overview of the legal background
of excessive force claims in Part III. Part IV will summarize the
Brooks court’s decision. Part V will analyze the excessive force issue in
connection with Tasers. Finally, Part VI will conclude.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Malaika Brooks was pulled over by Officer Ornelas for speeding
in a school zone on November 23, 2004.4 Brooks refused to sign the
1. 599 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
3. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1025, 1031. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Brooks, 500 F.3d at 1020, 1032. Because the officers appealed the denial of their
motion for summary judgment, the court assumed the correctness of Brooks’s account of the
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Notice of Infraction because she claimed she was not speeding.5
Officer Jones then arrived and Officer Ornelas told him about the
situation.6 Officer Jones attempted to obtain her signature and
assured Brooks “that signing was not tantamount to admitting the
violation,” but “[s]he . . . became upset, repeating ‘I’m not signing,
I’m not signing’ over and over.”7
The parties disputed whether the officers were asking Brooks to
sign “both a Notice based upon her speeding . . . and a Citation to
Appear based upon her refusal to sign the Notice”;8 however, the
court assumed the validity of Brooks’s assertion that she was only
asked to sign the Notice of Infraction.9
When Brooks refused to exit the car, Officer Jones showed her
his Taser and explained how badly it would hurt.10 Brooks told the
officers “she was pregnant and that she needed to use the
restroom.”11 Because she continued to stay in the car, Officer
Ornelas took the “key out of the ignition, dropping the keys on the
floorboard.”12 Officer Ornelas then “employed a pain compliance
technique, bringing Brooks’s left arm up behind her back,” and
Brooks grabbed the steering wheel to prevent him from removing
her from the car.13 Because she would not exit the car, “Officer
facts. See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e assume the
version of the material facts asserted by the non-moving party to be correct.”).
5. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1020. Brooks was pulled over for “driving 32 miles per hour,
while the posted speed limit was 20 miles per hour.” Id. at 1032 n.2 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 1020 (majority opinion).
7. Id. at 1020–21. The Notice of Infraction informs the driver “that a traffic law has
been violated and requires a signature indicating, without admitting to the crime, that the
recipient will respond as directed by the Notice.” Id. at 1020 n.3 (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
46.63.060 (2009)). Brooks had a similar encounter with police in 1996 when “she refused to
sign both the Notice and the Citation to Appear because she did not think she was guilty of
the traffic offense.” Id. at 1020–21 n.4.
8. Id. at 1020 n.3. The Citation to Appear, separate from the Notice of Infraction,
“includes the violation allegedly committed [and] requires a signature promising to appear in
court.” Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015 (2009)). Failure to sign a Citation to
Appear permits an officer to perform a custodial arrest. See id. at 1021 n.4 (“[T]he law would
have permitted custodial arrest.”). Failure to sign a Notice of Infraction “was at the time a
nonarrestable misdemeanor; now in Washington, it is not even that.” Id. at 1032 (Berzon, J.,
dissenting) (citing 2006 Wash. Legis. Serv. 1249 (West)).
9. See Schwenk, 204 F.3d at 1195 (“[W]e assume the version of the material facts
asserted by the non-moving party to be correct.”).
10. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1021.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Jones discharged the Taser [in drive-stun mode] against Brooks’s
thigh, through her sweat pants,” causing great pain.14 After Brooks
yelled and honked the horn, Officer Jones tased her on her shoulder
and on her bare neck.15 At this point, Brooks could not exit the car
because “her arm was still behind her back.”16 After the third
application of the Taser, the officers forced Brooks out of the car
“through a combination of pushing and pulling.”17 From the three
applications of the Taser, Brooks was burned on her “thigh, arm,
and neck” and received permanent “scars on her thigh and upper
arm.”18 As soon as the officers removed Brooks from her car, they
“laid her on her stomach in the street,” and she told them “they
were hurting her.”19
As a result of not cooperating with the officers, Brooks faced
charges for (1) “refusing to sign the Notice, and (2) resisting
arrest.”20 She was found guilty of the first charge, but the second was
dismissed due to a hung jury.21
Brooks asserted “a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and assault
and battery claims under state tort law for the alleged excessive
force.”22 The district court ruled that the officers used excessive
force; therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity,
and the court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment.23
The officers appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit
reversed.24

14. Id. “The Taser’s use in . . . ‘drive-stun’ mode—as the Officers used it here—involves
touching the Taser to the body and causes temporary, localized pain.” Id. at 1026. A Taser
used in barb mode results in Taser barbs sticking in the individual’s body causing loss of
muscular control. Id. at 1027.
15. Id. at 1021.
16. Id. Although the district court suggested that the Taser may have prevented her
from leaving, Brooks stated that she could not move because of the position of her arm. Id. at
1021 n.6.
17. Id. at 1021.
18. Id. at 1033 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1021 (majority opinion).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1020.
24. Id.
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III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
Under certain circumstances, officers are granted qualified
immunity in excessive force cases so they can avoid the hassle of
litigation.25 When deciding if a police officer is entitled to qualified
immunity, courts determine whether the officer had probable cause
to perform an arrest and whether the officer used excessive force.26
A. Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, an officer does not
have “to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation”27 if his or
her “conduct [does] not violate a clearly established federal right.”28
When determining whether to grant qualified immunity, a court asks
two questions: “(1) was there a violation of a constitutional [or
other] right, and, if so, then (2) was the right at issue ‘clearly
established’ such that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer
that his conduct was unlawful?”29
B. Probable Cause
In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment
is not violated when a police officer makes an arrest based on
probable cause, even when the arrest is “prohibited by state law.”30
In 2009, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an officer has probable cause
to perform an arrest “when the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent
person to believe that a crime has been committed.”31
25. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
26. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022, 1025.
27. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
28. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526).
29. Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001) overruled on other
grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). The Supreme Court held that
“government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978)).
30. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 166, 178 (2008).
31. Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Ybarra
v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). A reasonably prudent person is “a person who exercises
the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and judgment that society requires of its
members for the protection of their own and of others’ interests.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1380 (9th ed. 2009).
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In connection with determining if an officer’s use of force was
excessive, probable cause is analyzed when considering the totality of
the circumstances.32 In addition, state qualified immunity on assault
and battery claims may be prohibited if officers lack probable cause
for an arrest.33 In light of the two previous statements, the Brooks
court “consider[ed] whether the Officers had probable cause to
arrest Brooks.34
C. Excessive Force
1. Amount of force
When determining whether police officers used excessive force, a
court first evaluates the amount of force used by the officers.35 The
Ninth Circuit recently addressed claims of excessive force in
connection with Tasers.36 In Mattos v. Agarano, “a police officer
applied a Taser directly to plaintiff’s back, causing her to feel ‘an
incredible burning and painful feeling.’”37 The court ruled that the
Taser is somewhere between trivial and deadly force.38 But, the court
failed to “differentiate drive-stun and dart modes” and to

32. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005).
33. Staats v. Brown, 991 P.2d 615, 627–28 (2000). Lacking probable cause does not
necessarily prohibit state qualified immunity. See Guffey v. State, 690 P.2d 1163, 1167 (Wash.
1984). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity “when the officer (1) carries out a statutory
duty, (2) according to procedures dictated to him by statute and superiors, and (3) acts
reasonably.” Id. at 627.
34. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1022.
35. Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007).
36. See Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the officers did
not use excessive force when they used a Taser stun on a domestic violence victim who
attempted to stop the officers from arresting her husband); see also Bryan v. MacPherson, 630
F.3d 805, 833 (9th Cir. 2010). The court ruled that shooting a Taser at a man during a minor
traffic stop was excessive force. Id. However, the court reversed its prior ruling on Bryan and
said that “a reasonable officer confronting the circumstances faced by Officer MacPherson . . .
could have made a reasonable mistake of law in believing the use of the Taser was reasonable.”
Id. As such, the courts ruled that qualified immunity should not be denied because the officer
may not have had enough information to know that the use of a Taser “constituted an
intermediate level of force.” Id. Prior to the Bryan decision, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
pepper spray was more than a minimal use of force. See id. at 825 (citing Headwaters Forest
Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1200 (9th Cir. 2001)). It is unreasonable to
believe a police officer would not know that level of force of a Taser is greater than the level of
force of pepper spray. However, that is a topic for another note.
37. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1026 (quoting Mattos, 590 F.3d at 1085).
38. Mattos, 590 F.3d at 1087.
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“differentiate the quantum of force used on Mattos from the
quantum of force used in Bryan.”39
In Bryan v. MacPherson, the court again analyzed the level of
force of a Taser.40 When the dart mode of the Taser is used, the force
“constitute[s] an intermediate, significant level of force that must be
justified by the government interest involved.”41 In Bryan, a police
officer shot a barb into a man’s arm, causing him “to lose all
muscular control, fall face first onto the pavement, shatter four front
teeth, and suffer facial abrasions and swelling.”42 In addition, the
man required surgery to have the barb removed.43 As such, Tasers
used in this manner “constitute an ‘intermediate . . . quantum of
force.’”44 After determining the amount of force used by police
officers, courts analyze the Graham factors in light of the established
level of force.45
2. Graham factors
Courts evaluate excessive force claims “under the Fourth
Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness standard.’”46 This standard
provides for the balancing “of the intrusion on the individual’s
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.”47 To determine reasonableness, the
court weighs the following factors: “[1] the severity of the crime at
issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others,48 and [3] whether he is actively

39. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1026–27.
40. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826.
41. Id.
42. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1027 (citing Bryan v. MacPherson, 590 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir.
2009)).
43. Id.
44. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826 (quoting Sanders v. City of Fresno, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1149,
1168 (E.D. Cal. 2008)).
45. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Chew v.
Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)) (“The three factors articulated in Graham, and
other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a particular application of force, are not to be
considered in a vacuum but only in relation to the amount of force used . . . .”).
46. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989)).
47. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)).
48. This factor is the most significant of the Graham factors. See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441
(“[T]he most important single element of the three specified factors [is] whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.”).
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resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”49 These
factors from Graham are analyzed in conjunction with a fourth
factor, the totality of the circumstances, after determining the
amount of force used by the officers.50
Officers have the right to use some physical force in carrying out
an arrest,51 but “the force must be necessary to be reasonable.”52 For
example, the Brooks court ruled that using force on a suspect under
police control is not necessary, and therefore, not reasonable.53
Officers do not have “to use the least intrusive means available,” but
they “must act within the range of reasonable conduct.”54 The range
of reasonableness is determined by the totality of the
circumstances,55 “including whether a warning was given, and the
availability of alternative methods of capturing and subduing a
suspect.”56
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
In Brooks, the Ninth Circuit ruled that “the Officers’ use of force
[was] reasonable and not excessive under the Fourth Amendment,”
and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.57 First, the court
determined that the officers had probable cause to arrest Brooks.58
Next, in light of the multi-factor test from Graham v. Connor, the
court ruled that the officers’ use of force was not excessive.59
In contrast, the dissent argued that the officers lacked probable
cause to perform an arrest.60 The dissent also reasoned that the
49. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
50. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (“First, it is
necessary to assess the quantum of force used.”); Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804,
806 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9) (“In Graham, the Supreme Court
. . . did not . . . limit the inquiry to just these factors. Rather, the Court instructed that the jury
should consider . . . ‘the totality of the circumstances . . . .’”).
51. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
52. Brooks v. City of Seattle, 599 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Blankenhorn
v. City of Orange, 486 F.3d 463, 480 (9th Cir. 2007)).
53. Id. (citing Headwaters Forest Def. v. Cnty. of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1125
(9th Cir. 2002)).
54. Id. (citing Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1994)).
55. Forrester, 25 F.3d at 806 n.2 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).
56. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1025 (citations omitted).
57. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1031.
58. Id. at 1024.
59. Id. at 1031.
60. Id. at 1036 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
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officers’ use of force was excessive, and the officers were not entitled
to qualified immunity.61
A. Probable Cause
Brooks argued that the officers lacked probable cause for a
custodial arrest and that any amount of force was excessive.62
Nevertheless, the court stated that a lack of probable cause is only
one factor in an excessive force claim.63 The officers had the right to
“detain [Brooks] until they issued her a Notice,” and her “refusal to
sign the Notice gave the Officers probable cause to continue to
detain her.”64
The court found that probable cause for a custodial arrest existed
“for obstructing an officer.”65 Obstruction of an officer occurs when
a person impedes the officer in fulfilling his or her duties.66 The
court ruled that “a reasonably prudent person would have believed
Brooks was violating” the statute “by obstructing the Officers’
attempts to obtain her signature and complete the traffic stop.”67
The court also found that the officers had probable cause
because common law allows for a custodial arrest for traffic violations
when an officer reasonably believes that the suspect “‘will refuse to
respond to a citation.’”68 The court asserted that, based on Brooks’s
repeated uncooperative actions during the stop, the officers had
reason to believe she would not respond to the citation.69 Thus, the
officers had probable cause.70

61. Id. at 1043–44.
62. Id. at 1022 (majority opinion).
63. See id. (quoting Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004)).
64. Id. at 1023. “Under Washington law, a police officer may arrest an individual for
committing a misdemeanor in his presence.” Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100
(2009)). “Failure to sign the Notice is a misdemeanor.” Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
46.61.022 (2009)).
65. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.020 (2009)). “That violation is a gross
misdemeanor for which custodial arrest is appropriate.” Id. at 1024 (citing WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9A.76.020(3), 10.31.100 (2009)).
66. Id. at 1024 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.76.020 (2010)).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting State v. Hehman, 578 P.2d 527, 528–29 (Wash. 1978)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Because Brooks obstructed the officers and would likely have not
responded to the citation, the court reasoned, the officers had
probable cause to perform a custodial arrest.71
B. Excessive Force
The officers contended that their use of a Taser to force Brooks
to cooperate “was not objectively unreasonable,” in part because the
officers made other attempts to obtain cooperation and warned that
“the Taser would be used.”72 Furthermore, they argued that,
although the initial risk of harm to the officers and others was low,
the risk increased when Brooks “became confrontational and refused
to leave her running car.”73
1. Amount of force
The court ruled that the use of the Taser in drive-stun mode is a
low-level amount of force because the use is similar to “pain
compliance applied through the use of” various police techniques
such as pepper spray.74 The use of the Taser was a serious intrusion;
however, the amount of force of the Taser in this mode did not rise
to the level of an intermediate force.75
2. Graham factors
In Graham v. Connor, the Court indicated that three factors to
consider in determining whether excessive force was used are: (1) the
severity of the crime, (2) the threat posed to officers or bystanders,
and (3) whether the suspect is resisting arrest or attempting to flee.76
The court also indicated that these three factors should be analyzed
in conjunction with the totality of the circumstances.77
a. Severity of the crime. Brooks was initially “detained for refusing
to sign . . . the Notice” and later held “for obstructing a police

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1028.
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
See id.
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officer in the exercise of his official duties.”78 Although obstruction is
more serious than the traffic offense, “it is . . . not a serious crime.”79
Accordingly, the court ruled that “[t]his factor weigh[ed] in favor of
finding the force excessive.”80
b. Threat posed to officers or bystanders. The court considers this
factor the most important of the Graham factors.81 Consequently,
the court paid special attention to the fact that Brooks had access to
her keys while they were on the floorboard of the car.82 Because “she
might [have] . . . drive[n] off erratically,” some threat existed.83 Also,
she posed a threat because she continued to disregard the officers’
orders, and the “officers [were] unable to predict what type of
noncompliance might come next.”84 The court ruled that this factor
weighed against finding the force excessive because Brooks posed
“some threat by virtue of her continued non-compliance.”85
c. Resistance to arrest and risk of flight. Brooks did all she could
to prevent the officers from removing her from the car.86 As a result,
the court ruled that Brooks’s resistance weighed “against finding the
force used excessive.”87
d. Totality of the circumstances. The next factor the court
addressed was whether the officers should have used another method
to remove Brooks from her car.88 The court stated that the officers
had no other alternatives prescribed to them from the police
department other than two similar pain compliance techniques—
pepper spray and hair control holds.89 The court contended that
there was no way to determine if the other methods would have
worked and suggested that pepper spray may have caused more
78. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1025.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1028–29.
85. Id. at 1029.
86. See id. (“[S]he grasped the steering wheel and wedged herself between the seat and
steering wheel, and she refused to get out of the car when asked.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1029–30.
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harm; thus, the court ruled that this factor did “not weigh in favor of
finding the Officers’ actions unreasonable.”90
Beyond these considerations, the court addressed three
additional factors: (1) that the officers gave multiple warnings before
using the Taser, (2) that the officers considered Brooks’s pregnancy,
and (3) that the officers tased Brooks three times.91 The officers’
warnings and consideration of Brooks’s pregnancy weighed against
finding the force excessive, and the multiple tasings weighed in favor
of excessive force. But in totality, this was not enough to overcome
the other factors.92 In light of all of these factors, the court held that
the officers’ use of force was not excessive.93
C. Dissent
1. Probable cause
The dissent argued that the officers waived the argument of
obstruction because they “never raised this theory in their briefs.”94
Even if the obstruction argument were properly made, the officers
did not have probable cause because they were “entitled [only] ‘to
identify [her], check for outstanding warrants, check the status of
[her] license, insurance identification card, and the vehicle’s
registration, and complete and issue a notice of traffic infractions.’”95
Also, the dissent argued, the claim for probable cause based on the
fear that Brooks might not have responded to a citation was
waived.96 However, there would be no probable cause because
Brooks did not give the officers any reason to believe she would not
respond.97

90. Id. at 1030. “[P]epper spray effects . . . last[] up to forty-five minutes.” Id. (citing
LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2000)).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1031.
94. Id. at 1034 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of
Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007)).
95. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.021 (2010)).
96. Id. at 1035.
97. Id. at 1036.
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2. Excessive force
a. Amount of force. A “single activation of a Taser in drive-stun
mode [is] a ‘serious intrusion.’”98 The Eighth Circuit “held that a
reasonable jury could find that a single application of a Taser in
drive-stun mode to the arm” of someone who committed a minor
offense “constituted excessive force.”99 The Brooks dissent argued,
following the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, that the amount of
force in this instance was significant and excessive.100
b. Graham factors. The crime that Brooks was alleged to have
committed—“refusing to sign the notice of infraction”—was less
than not serious; “it was trivial.”101 Hence, the first Graham factor
weighed heavily in favor of finding the use of force excessive.102
Additionally, the dissent contended, the threats to the officers’ safety
spoken of by the majority were not real.103 Thus, like the first factor,
this factor weighed in favor of finding the use of force excessive.104
Lastly, the dissent conceded that Brooks did resist arrest, but stated
that if “[t]his level and type of resistance . . . weighs against a finding
of excessive force at all, [it] does so only slightly.”105
c. Totality of the circumstances. The dissent argued that two
additional factors weighed in favor of finding the use of force
excessive.106 First, the officers had no right to perform a custodial
arrest.107 Second, “the Officers could not have known how this
woman who was seven months pregnant would respond . . . to the
repeated application of thousands of volts of electricity to any part of

98. Id. at 1037 (quoting Mattos v. Agarano, 590 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010)).
99. Id. (quoting Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 497–98 (8th Cir.
2009)).
100. Id. at 1038.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1039 (“The majority . . . departs from the record to speculate about actions
Brooks might have taken, and concludes, rather inexplicably, that a mother driving her son to
school did pose ‘some threat.’”).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1041.
106. Id. at 1042.
107. Id.
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her body.”108 Accordingly, the dissent maintained, these two
additional factors weighed in favor of a finding of excessive force.109
3. Qualified immunity
In its conclusion, the dissent argued that because the use of force
was excessive, and “the right violated was clearly established,” the
officers should not have been entitled to qualified immunity.110
V. ANALYSIS
The Brooks dissent was correct in arguing that the officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity. First, the officers did not have
probable cause to perform an arrest. Next, the officers clearly
exceeded the amount of necessary force when they performed an
arrest on Brooks.
A. Probable Cause
An officer has “probable cause . . . when the facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to cause a
reasonably prudent person to believe that a crime has been
committed.”111 The officers obviously had probable cause when
Brooks refused to sign the Notice in front of the officers.112
Nonetheless, Brooks’s crime was a civil infraction,113 and the dissent
correctly pointed out that “[a]ll the Officers had authority to do at
that point was to ‘detain’ Brooks ‘for a reasonable period of time
necessary to identify her,” check for warrants, determine if she
owned the car and had insurance, and issue the Notice.114 Even after
she refused to sign the Notice, which is a misdemeanor, the officers
“were entitled [only] to detain her . . . as long as ‘reasonably
necessary to issue and serve a citation and notice,’ which . . . they
never did.”115
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1042–43.
110. Id. at 1043–44.
111. Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009).
112. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1020–21 (majority opinion).
113. SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 11.52.100 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§
46.61.440, 46.63.020 (2009).
114. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1033–34 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing WASH. REV. CODE §
46.61.021 (2009)).
115. Id. at 1034 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 46.64.015 (2009)).
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The court’s analysis of the officers’ probable cause should have
ended there but the court speculated as to why the officers may have
had probable cause.116 The court concluded that Brooks obstructed
justice;117 however, Brooks’s actions did not limit the officers’ ability
to carry out their legal duties.118 Additionally, the court ruled that
she might have failed to respond to a citation had one been issued.119
Other than the fact that she failed the sign the Notice, the court had
no reason to believe she would not respond.120
The court’s reasoning for finding probable cause is flawed for
two reasons: (1) the officers waived the right to have those
arguments heard when they failed to raise the issues in their briefs,121
and (2) the court should not be allowed to punish Brooks for a
crime it thought she would have committed had she been given the
chance.
The court should be precluded from deciding probable cause
based on issues raised sua sponte. When the court raises issues on its
own accord, the losing party—in this case Brooks—does not have an
opportunity to present its arguments to the court. In many instances,
that party may have a sufficient counter-argument, but it is never
given the chance to plead its case. Judges should resist the urge to
rule based on issues not raised on appeal, because they do not have
enough information to make an informed decision.122 Courts do not
have to ignore new issues. In fact, the court has many options,
including asking the parties for supplemental briefs.123 The cost of
116. Id. at 1023–24 (majority opinion).
117. Id. at 1024.
118. Id. at 1034 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 1024 (majority opinion).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1034 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (citing Outdoor Media Grp., Inc. v. City of
Beaumont, 506 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2007)).
122. Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 245 (2002).
We don’t know enough about [sua sponte issues]. You’re playing God then because
you haven’t had the benefit of the lawyers, the judges below, or the clients, or the
evidence. You’re just playing God without a record, and you have to assume a
certain competence in your counsel . . . . I’m loath to do it. . . . I guess I really don’t
like to do it because it’s too dangerous. There’s nothing worse than a lawyer being
beaten by an assumption that simply is incorrect and wasn’t raised.
Id. (quoting Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers: Information Gathering in the
Adversay System 122 (1978) (ellipsis in original)
123. Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an
Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2002).
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ruling on a case based on an incorrect assumption or incomplete
evidence is greater than the cost of asking the parties to submit
supplemental briefs.
In addition, it was unjust for the court to base its ruling partially
on a crime it thought Brooks might commit. Making this ruling was
akin to finding that the officers used excessive force because they
would have beaten Brooks with their batons had they been given the
opportunity. Both scenarios are equally outrageous. The court
should never base its ruling, whether in a civil or criminal case, on
something that a party may have done if the situation had presented
itself.
B. Excessive Force
When all facts are analyzed in perspective, the court’s ruling that
the force was not excessive is incomprehensible. A seven-month
pregnant woman was pulled over and would not cooperate with
police.124 The highly trained police officers could have left her with
an unsigned ticket, but instead chose to remain on scene and escalate
the problem.125 Three officers surrounded the woman and repeatedly
tased her to force her to exit her car.126 The officers likely had no
idea what could have happened to her unborn child.127 Because three
officers refused to walk away from a confrontational speeder, a
pregnant woman was tased three times, leaving burns and permanent
scars.128 The officers also laid the pregnant woman on her stomach,
as she complained that they were hurting her, to perform the
When appellate judges believe that a potentially dispositive issue was missed by the
parties, they have several options: (1) they can ignore the issue; (2) they can spot the
issue in their opinion, but treat it as not properly raised or waived; (3) they can spot
the issue and remand it for resolution in the first instance in the trial court; (4) they
can ask the parties for supplemental briefs before deciding the issue; (5) they can
decide the issue without briefs; (6) they can spot the issue in the opinion, and write
dicta.
Id.
124. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1020–21 (majority opinion).
125. See id. at 1020 n.4.
126. Id. at 1021.
127. See Preterm Labor and Birth: A Serious Pregnancy Complication, MARCH OF DIMES,
http://www.marchofdimes.com/Pregnancy/preterm_indepth.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2011) (“Some studies have found that certain lifestyle and environmental factors may put a
woman at greater risk of preterm labor. These factors include . . . physical . . . or emotional
abuse . . . [and] stress . . . .”).
128. Brooks, 599 F.3d at 1020–21, 1027.
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arrest.129 All these events occurred because a woman was driving
twelve miles per hour over the speed limit.130
The court’s ruling that using a Taser in drive-stun mode is a “less
than intermediate” amount of force is incorrect. Other examples of
less than intermediate amounts of force include wrist twisting and
hair pulling.131 The Seattle Police Department (“SPD”) recognized
the risk of tasing certain members of the public when it changed its
policy six months after this incident to protect pregnant women,
elderly people, and others.132 The pertinent SPD policy states that
“the need to stop the behavior should clearly justify the potential for
additional risks.”133 Additionally, after experiencing the dangers of
tasing, the Army’s occupational health sciences directors warned that
“[s]eizures and ventricular fibrillation can be induced by the electric
current” and “the practice of using these weapons on U.S. Army
military and civilian forces in training is not recommended.”134 If the
Army is concerned for the safety of its fit and healthy soldiers, this
court should also be concerned for the safety of a seven-month
pregnant woman.
In addition to the Army’s warnings, Amnesty International has
warned of the dangers of Tasers.135 In the last decade, “351
individuals in the United States have died after being shocked by
police Tasers.”136 One example is a 39 year-old-man named Byron
Black who was killed in 2004 by a police Taser.137 Black was fighting
with police in his prison cell when the police “used a Taser in drivestun mode and pepper spray. He collapsed at the scene and was
pronounced dead in [the] hospital.” 138 Contrary to what the court
suggests, the previous example, along with many others over the past

129. Id. at 1033 (Berzon, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1032 n.2.
131. Id. at 1028, 1030 (majority opinion).
132. Hector Castro, Police Used Taser on Pregnant Driver: Woman Convicted of Refusing
to Obey Seattle Officers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 10, 2005, at B1.
133. Id.
134. Robert Anglen, Study Raises Concerns Over Tasers’ Safety, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 13,
2006, at 1A.
135. AMNESTY INT’L, ‘LESS THAN LETHAL’? THE USE OF STUN WEAPONS IN US LAW
ENFORCEMENT (2008).
136. Taser Abuse in the United States, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/ushuman-rights/taser-abuse/page.do?id=1021202 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
137. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 135, at 61.
138. Id.
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ten years,139 proves that drive-stun tasing does not belong in the
same category as hair pulling and wrist twisting.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court’s decision that the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity is partly the result of the judges deciding issues not raised
on appeal. The outcome is unjust when the parties are not allowed
to plead their case. In addition, the Brooks court severely understated
the dangers of Tasers, especially when used on pregnant women. In
conclusion, the court erred because it incorrectly found probable
cause for the custodial arrest and because it grossly misrepresented
the dangers of Tasers.
Joseph G. Walker

139. “Eddie Alvarado was shocked five times in drive-stun mode after he was observed to
have seizure activity and continued to ‘thrust and kick’ as he lay prone on the floor handcuffed
behind his back; moments later he was found to be in cardiopulmonary arrest.” Id. at 52.
“Johnny Lozoya . . . was shocked with a Taser in drive-stun mode when he became combative
while restrained on a board during transportation to [the] hospital and went into cardiac arrest
while still in the ambulance.” Id. Officers “used a Taser in drive-stun mode and pepper spray”
on Byron Black. Id. at 61. “He collapsed at the scene and was pronounced dead in [the]
hospital.” Id.
 J.D. Candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young
University. Thanks to my wife Felicia and daughter Amelia. You two are my motivation.
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